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Abstract—The integration of monitoring and control networks
at different voltage levels and across utility boundaries has made
it harder to maintain and asses the resilience of power systems
due to increasing cyber attacks. On the software side, a variety
of research efforts pursue cyber protection algorithms, such as
spoof detection techniques. On the hardware and firmware side,
research has demonstrated the feasibility of adversarial attacks
by providing an entry point at the device level. This work
proposes and evaluates two detection performance metrics for a
variety of cyber spoofing attacks introduced in a realistic Phasor
Measurement Unit (PMU) network for a hybrid transmission and
distribution power system. This research finds that both proposed
metrics show promise in aiding a spoof detection algorithm in
consistently detecting spoofs in power system measurements.
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of smart grid devices at the distribution
level creates new attack surfaces that can be used by adver-
saries planning cyber intrusions. The Advanced Metering In-
frastructure (AMI) is one place that additional attack surfaces
are created, and the number of AMI devices is growing rapidly.
In 2014, nearly 60 million AMI devices were present on the
U.S. grid, a number that is expected to grow to nearly 1.1
billion by 2022 [1], [2].
Along with the growth in AMI adoption there has been
proliferation in the number of methods used to compromise
them, including compromising single meters through reverse
engineering or imitating RF communications. More seriously,
once a single meter is compromised the attacker could utilize
the access to the network to spread malware to other meters
on the network, a process which has been demonstrated by
researchers [3], [4].
AMI has the ability to both track loads in real time and
remotely connect or disconnect the loads they monitor [5].
A compromised device then, not only gives adversaries the
ability to control the measurements sent to operators, but
also to maliciously manipulate system loads [6]. Such load
manipulations could be used to physically damage the system
by oscillating large amount of load [7], [8], which could
seriously affect the stability of large areas of the grid [9].
Additionally, the ability to control measurements could not
only allow adversaries to cover up the measurements that show
operators the load manipulations, but could allow adversaries
to utilize economic attacks by adjusting usage information [3].
Therefore, it is important for system operators to be able
to detect an intrusion, specifically when the data reported
from the grid has been spoofed and is the result of an
adversary changing real measurements to artificially-generated
data. Previous work has been done detecting spoofed data
in measurements from the transmission level of the power
grid [10]. However, the threats posed by compromised AMI
affect the distribution level. It is anticipated that threats at
this level will be harder to detect due to the higher varieties
of loads and smaller amounts of electrical coupling between
locations of different areas of the distribution network. Our
work seeks to improve the work in [10], and show that the
methods in that research can extend to the distribution level. To
do this, we leverage our inter-institution phasor measurement
unit (PMU) network to test the performance of two spoof
detection metrics. These metrics indicate when it is likely that
a spoof may be occurring. We then show the performance of
these metrics on both spoofed and non-spoofed versions of
two events, data from normal operational data, and one from
a load manipulation we created at the OSU campus.
II. DISTRIBUTION LEVEL PMU NETWORK
Our research PMU network consists of seven PMUs located
at the Oregon State (OSU), Portland State (PSU) and Washing-
ton State, Vancouver (WSU) University campuses. The PMUs
provide monitoring at the utilization level (120/208 V), with
the exception of two PMUs at OSU, which monitor a 20 kV
distribution substation and auto-transformer providing 480 V
service into OSU’s power engineering laboratory. All PMUs
monitor three phase service.
The PMU network is of particular value to research in spoof
detection because two of the monitored locations have control-
lable loads that can be used to demonstrate the generation of
real system events that can be spoofed for the purposes of
testing our algorithms. The first of these locations is OSU’s
Wallace Energy Systems & Renewables Facility (WESRF)
power laboratory, where a 750 kVA, 480 V three-phase load
exists that is controlled by a PC workstation. The second
location is at PSU where a similar, but smaller, laboratory
connection exists. At both of these locations, either of the
controllers may be used to mount a physical attack on the load.
Then the attacker could mask the physical attack by using a
man-in-the-middle injection point to spoof the data coming
from the PMU monitoring the location. In this paper, a proof
of concept attack is staged at the OSU campus. However, it is
clear from the variety of controls, machines, and loads under
the control of the researchers that many more power system
events could be generated in the future.
Of the seven PMUs in the network, five of the PMUsare
concentrated and very close to the OSU network. The other
two, at PSU and WSU allow for visibility from a larger
distance away from the OSU campus.
The PMUs report data at 60 samples per second to a Phasor
Data Concentrator (PDC) located at the OSU campus. The
PDC stores data in CSV, SynchroWAVe, and PDAT formats.All
of these file-types are archived for permanent storage so that
we may reliably access them from a variety of software tools.
III. METRICS FOR SPOOF DETECTION
This section describes the metrics that we use to aid spoof
detection. First, we describe the inter-PMU correlations. We
then describe two additional metrics designed to detect when
a PMU ceases to follow the same trends as the others, and
therefore is likely being spoofed. These metrics are then used
by an MLA, along with other information, to identify when
data from a PMU is being spoofed.
A. Inter-PMU correlations
Previous work determined that inter-PMU correlations
were useful for detecting spoofs on transmission level PMU
data [10]. Inter-PMU correlations are calculated as the Pearson
correlation coefficients for one measurement type for any pair
of PMUs on the network. Since it was anticipated that the
inter-PMU correlations would be weaker on the distribution
data, we focus on the strongest correlations identified in [10].
Namely, inter-PMU correlations in frequency (f ), positive
sequence voltage magnitude (|V1|), and positive sequence
voltage angle (φ1). We tested these correlations for the time
windows identified in [10] on distribution data and chose the
ten second window because it provided the cleanest signals on
our data. Additionally, we used the algorithm in [11] to “un-
wrap” the phase angles to undo rollovers in the data because
these transitions affected the correlations in a way that did not
represent the underlying data’s continuous nature. For the rest
of this paper, an inter-PMU correlation is represented by Xt,i,j
where t is the correlation type (f , |V1|, φ1), calculated between
PMU i and PMU j. Xt denotes the set of all correlations of
a given type.
B. Correlation out-of-bounds
First, we created the correlation out-of-bounds metric
(OOB). In [10], a similar metric, the MCOOB is used.
However, we wanted a more defined version of this that was
a binary value for each instant in time, since this would
translate better to being the input to an MLA. The OOB
determines if the inter-PMU correlation is outside of the
envelope determined by the median of the set of all of
the inter-PMU correlations for a given type. The width of
the envelope is defined by α which we set to α = 0.3
for our results, determined experimentally. The purpose of
the OOB is to capture when the value of one inter-PMU
correlation drifts from the values seen by the rest of the PMUs.
Equation 1 shows the mathematical formulation of the OOB
for correlation between PMU i and PMU j of type t.
OOBt,i,j = [(1− α)× X̃t < Xt,i,j < (1 + α)× X̃] (1)
C. Correlation out-of-swing
We observed that the correlations tended to de-correlate/re-
correlate at the same time, but with different rates. To account
for this, we created the out-of-swing (OOS). The different rates
caused the OOB to improperly capture this trend. OOS deter-
mines the direction of change for the inter-PMU correlations,
or the unit direction, at time k Dt,i,j(k), shown in Equation 2.
This takes the value of -1 if decreasing, 1 if increasing, and 0
if not changing. Next, we determine if the correlations of type
t from a given PMU i are changing in the same direction as
all the correlations of the same type. To calculate the direction
of change, for a single PMU, we sum Dt,i,j for a single PMU,
by holding i constant and sweeping all available j values, and
then find the unit direction by dividing by the absolute value
of the same sum. Then, for the whole group, we do the same
type of operation, by summing Dt,l,m for all available PMUs
l and m, and dividing by the absolute value. We then perform
a logical check to determine if the direction of change for the
single PMU is different than the whole group. If true, OOSt,i
is 1, otherwise 0, as shown in (3). We evaluate the difference
between Xt,i,j(k) and Xt,i,j(k − β) instead of simply k and
k − 1, to help filter small changes from step to step that do
not reflect the overall change of the data. We found in practice




















An attacker generating a spoofed signal S at time t with
the aim of avoiding detection would likely aim to satisfy
a couple of criterion: continuity - the change in the signal
value at the onset of the spoof is small; precedent - the signal
values generated through the course of the spoof are within
normal operating ranges and have distributions similar to
non-spoofed data; time-coherence - there are small variations
between similar to that of non-spoofed data; signal-coherence
- the spoofed data values must be consistent with each other
because they are normally dependent on the system state
and each other; and, geographic-coherence - the spoofed data
must remain consistent with what is being observed at nearby
locations in the grid.
In this paper, three spoofing techniques are examined that















St+i = St-1  
mask(i) = i
stale(i) = i
Fig. 1. Visual representation of three spoofing strategies.
is illustrated in Figure 1, where circular nodes indicate real
sampled data from a PMU (solid nodes) or spoofed data
(unfilled nodes). The approaches are described briefly below
and illustrated in Fig 1.
Replace with Last Value (RLV): The simplest spoofing
strategy is to replace new measurements with the last value
obtained before the spoof began. The RLV strategy shows
that no “real” PMU measurements are required after the spoof
begins and is able to mask data for the entire duration it is
enabled. Since the last signal value is repeated, the spoofed
data gets increasingly stale (out of date) as the spoof continues.
Mirroring: We can partially address the weakness of the
RLV strategy by using historic data from the moments just
prior to the spoof. By playing signals back in reverse, different
spoof characteristics are achieved. As with the RLV spoof, all
data after the spoof starts is masked. Mirroring produces a
much more natural distribution of signal samples, which have
the same incremental changes as recently observed values,
with the trade off that the mirroring spoof must reach further
back to append data so it becomes stale twice as fast, and
looses geographic coherence more quickly than RLV.
Time-dilation: Both the RLV and Mirroring strategies only
require data obtained prior to the spoof onset at time t. An
alternative approach is to create a spoof by resampling time
and playing a true (historic) signal back more slowly. The
example in Figure 1, shows time-dilation playing back data
twice as slowly as normal. 2x-time-dilation masks i/2 samples
and grows stale at a rate of i/2.
The time-dilation approach improves upon RLV by gen-
erating non-stationary signals that reasonably follow the an-
ticipated distribution. It improves upon the mirroring spoof
because it maintains a higher level geographic consistence
since the ratio of mask(i)/stale(i) is higher for time-dilation
than mirroring.
V. TESTS
To evaluate our spoof detection methods, two different PMU
data sets were collected. The first occurs when no known
events take place. The second contains a proof-of-concept
generator attack performed using the generator at OSU, which
is under the control of the research team. Using these events,
the spoofing methods described in Section IV were used to
replace all of the target PMU’s reported measurements for a
specified period of time, which varied based on the length
needed by each spoof to cover the desired period.
A. Baseline spoofs with normal data
Baseline spoofs with normal data allow us to test the
performance of the spoof detection metrics at covering up what
we believe to be normal data. This provides us something to
compare to the event spoofs, and lets us know that the metrics
are not finding abnormalities in the data that are inherent to
an event rather than spoofing. For this data set, we selected
five minutes of data from our system. The selection was per-
formed arbitrarily. However, we verified that no known events
occurred during the time period. Five minutes was chosen as
this was the amount of time we anticipated collecting during
the event spoofs. Additionally, since we knew we would be
spoofing the WESRF PMU in the event spoofs, we decided to
spoof it in the baseline spoofs.
B. Event spoofs with abnormal data
The test system at OSU was used to test the spoof metrics
on event data. This system is a 300 HP motor, driven by a
250 kW drive.The drive directly is coupled to a wound rotor
synchronous machine that can be instantaneously connected
or disconnected from a large water rheostat load.Attacks that
oscillate large loads have been shown to be valid and poten-
tially harmful [12], [8], so we made our test event resemble the
beginning of this type of attack. To do this we connected the
generator to the rheostat load at half of its rated output speed
for one minute, then disconnected the rheostat load, causing
a sudden decrease of power from the lab feeder. The spoofs
were then constructed in order to completely hide the sudden
drop in power.
VI. RESULTS
This section discusses results for the two sets of data
described in Section V using the various methods described in
Section IV. We calculated the Pearson correlation-coefficients
for all types of correlations and PMUs over a ten second
window, then calculated the OOS and OOB, as described in
Section III. We calculated the fraction of time the OOS and
OOB were active separately for the time leading up to the
beginning of the spoof, and during the spoof. We did these
calculations this way to compare against various periods of
time because the time dilation spoofing method required a
different length of time to properly cover the event. We used
two groupings for the statistical analysis of the OOS and OOB
values: the first, the spoofed group (S) that contains all the
PMUs that had data spoofed, in this case only WESRF; the
second, the non-spoofed group (NS) that contained the rest of
the PMUs that did not have data modified.
In order to evaluate the performance of the OOS and OOB
metrics, it is important to note our goals. For these metrics to
function well as the inputs to an MLA, they must identify only
the PMU that is being spoofed, and only mark it as such during
the spoof. In order to evaluate this, we created the following
conditions for both the OOB and the OOS metrics:
1) Before the spoof, the NS group must see minimal OOB
and OOS fractions.
2) Before the spoof, the S group must see minimal OOB
and OOS fractions.
3) During the spoof, the NS group must see very similar
OOB and OOS fractions compared to before the spoof.
4) During the spoof, the S group must see significantly
larger OOB and OOS fractions.
A. Baseline spoofs with normal data
The results for the OOS fractions are illustrated in Figure 2.
We evaluate the results according to the four criteria. Criteria
one is mostly satisfied, though to varying degrees for each
type of correlation, with the |V1| begin the worse, on the upper
end indicating that there may be spoofs happening when none
are happening almost 30% of the time. Requirement two is
also mostly satisfied, with much smaller fractions than the NS
group, probably due to the fact that only one PMU is included.
The third and fourth criterion can be observed in Table I. We
see that the third is again mostly satisfied, as the increases here
are on average only as large as 1.72. The fourth is satisfied,
as we see the average increase ranging from 5 to 55 times the
pre-spoof values.
Fig. 2. Pre-spoof baseline OOS fraction distributions for the spoofed PMU
(WESRF, denoted by S) and the non-spoofed group (all others, denoted by
NS)
Next, we examined the OOB fractions, and evaluated each
of the requirements for good performance. Requirements one
and two can be observed in Figure 3. From this we see that
the first and second criteria are satisfied for the f and φ1
correlation types but probably not for the |V1| correlation, as
we see values here upwards of 0.50, meaning that 50% of the
time this will lead a MLA to falsely label data as spoofed.
Table I shows the results that help us make a determination
on the third and fourth requirements for good spoof detection
metrics. We see that there is good performance with φ1, as
before the spoof the fraction was 0 and after the spoof it
was large for the S group and there was no increase for the
NS group. The frequency correlation also yielded acceptable
performance for these requirements, though while we see
approximately 6 times increase on average for the S group, we
see values for increase greater than 2 for the NS group, which
is not ideal. The |V1| correlation type fails requirement four
as there is no increase for the S group, but passes requirement
three since there is also no increase for the NS group.
TABLE I
BASELINE FACTOR OF INCREASE IN OOS/OOB FRACTIONS FROM
PRE-SPOOF TO DURING-SPOOF.
Metric Type Spoofed PMU Non-spoofed PMUsMean Median Mean Median
OOS
f 55.39 49.83 1.72 0.67
φ1 14.02 11.14 0.71 0.59
|V1| 5.45 4.98 1.12 1.32
OOB
f 6.90 6.88 1.81 2.74
φ1 Large Large None None
|V1| 1.32 1.30 1.28 1.34
Fig. 3. Pre-spoof baseline OOB fraction distributions for both groups (S, NS)
B. Event spoofs with abnormal data
To begin with, the OOS fractions were analyzed. From the
pre-spoof Figure 4 we see how well the first two requirements
of a spoof detection metric hold up. Due to a low amount
of pre-spoof activity for both groups both requirements are
satisfied, though, the |V1|, has higher levels of pre-spoof
activity, so it may not be fully met here. Table II shows
that requirement three is very well satisfied, with most of the
average increases being very close to one for the NS group,
and the fourth criteria is also satisfied, though at an average
increase of only around three. Again, |V1| may not fully meet
this criteria.
TABLE II
GENERATOR EVENT FACTOR OF INCREASE IN OOS/OOB FRACTIONS
FROM PRE-SPOOF TO DURING-SPOOF.
Metric Type Spoofed PMU Non-spoofed PMUsMean Median Mean Median
OOS
f 26.43 24.14 1.03 1.22
φ1 6.32 6.04 1.29 1.43
|V1| 2.87 2.80 1.02 1.04
OOB
f 2.82 2.14 2.68 3.43
φ1 Large Large Small Small
|V1| 1.18 1.16 1.17 1.17
Fig. 4. Pre-spoof generator event OOS fraction distributions both groups (S,
NS).
Fig. 5. Pre-spoof generator event OOB fraction distributions for both groups
(S, NS)
Rounding out the analysis of the spoofs over the generator
event, we analyzed the OOB fractions for three spoofing
methods. We see from Figure 5 that with such high pre-spoof
values, |V1| does not satisfy requirement one or two, and f
only partially satisfies them, showing values nearing 0.40; φ1,
however definitely satisfies both requirements. Finally, from
Table II, only φ1 and |V1| have values at or around one for
the NS, and as such are the only ones who satisfy requirement
three. Additionally, |V1| shows no significant increase for the
S group during the spoof, and so fails requirement four, and
f only shows a moderate increase of around two, and so
only marginally satisfies it; once again, however, φ1 definitely
satisfies requirement four.
C. Summary
From the results of both the baseline and event spoofs,
a couple of things are clear. First, the voltage angle and
the frequency correlations are the most useful. The voltage
angle coupled with the OOB produced the most binary results
(off pre-spoof, on during spoof). Additionally, the frequency
correlation produced the best results when coupled with the
OOS. These satisfying the requirements that we defined for
good spoof metrics. Also, the OOB showed that it is really
only reliably effective when paired with the voltage angle,
though it proved it could be very effective then. The OOS
performed better, satisfying more of the requirements for most
of the correlation types.
VII. CONCLUSION
This work focused on evaluating the performance of two
different spoof detection metrics.To test these metrics, we
spoofed data using three types of spoofs: mirroring, replace-
last-value, and time-dilation. We established a baseline for
the data by replacing segments of normal operating data at
one PMU. Next, leveraging the WESRF laboratory, it was
possible to create a hardware event using a large motor in
the WESRF laboratory. The data were collected from this
event and spoofed in order to cover the event. This work
only examines one event created this way, but future work
will be able to leverage this hardware/software framework to
do much more in-depth validation of software used to detect
spoofing. The OOB and OOS metrics were calculated using
the inter-PMU correlations in frequency, and positive sequence
voltage magnitude and angle. We determined that the OOS had
the most consistent performance of the two metrics, showing
promising performance with all three inter-PMU correlation
types. However, the OOB may be particularly useful when
paired with voltage magnitude inter-PMU correlation as well.
This work will be expanded upon by testing with more events,
and types of events, created in the laboratory and by expanding
the abilities of the metrics by incorporating them into a MLA.
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